* The desirability of avoiding "circuity of action" and allowing instead direct recovery from intermediaries. In his role as Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts [1965] , Prosser distilled the previous 30+ years of academic debate and what he regarded as the leading judicial opinions about strict product liability into 402A. Nonetheless, injured parties still faced formidable problems of proof, only somewhat alleviated by the rule of res ipsa loquitur, and reaching intermediaries such as wholesalers remained troublesome.
Some courts expanded manufacturers' and intermediaries' liabilities through changes in warranty law. Though he roundly criticized warranty law as a means for achieving strict liability to consumers, Prosser [1966, p. 791 ] hailed a warranty case as "the fall of the citadel of privity" [Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors 1960] . Henningsen upheld the validity of product injury claims brought by the spouse of a new car purchaser against both the manufacturer and the dealer. Pointing to "modem marketing conditions," the Henningsen court found that an implied warranty of merchantability, i.e., that goods are fit to use for the general purpose for which they were designed, attached to the car and followed it through the distribution system to the buyer and members of his household. None of the traditional contract defenses, particularly privity and warranty disclaimer provisions, insulated the manufacturer or its dealer from liability. In justifying its decision, the court stated its intent to allocate losses caused by injuries from defective products to the parties best able to control the risks and equitably allocate the costs [ [Rabin 1990 , p. 81]; and 48 states presently utilize some form of strict liability in cases stemming from productrelated injuries.5
As currently applied, strictly liability refers to liability without reference to the defendant's behavior; instead, it examines the nature of the allegedly defective product. That is, to recoup damages, the plaintiff consumer must show that the defendant marketer's product caused the injury in question. Furthermore, the injured plaintiff must prove that the product was defective in some manner (e.g., unsafely designed, improperly manufactured, accompanied by inadequate warnings) when the consumer acquired it. In addition, product liability law varies from state to state; hence, each is free, for example, to determine how strict liability is to be applied within its boundaries. ]. This comment also includes a broad policy rationale, however, which might be read to apply to one in the business of selling used goods:
The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the special responsibility for the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the business of supplying human beings with products which may endanger the safety of their persons and property, and the forced reliance upon that undertaking on the part of those who purchase such goods.
This raises more difficult questions regarding sales of equipment previously used in the seller's business. A worker sought damages from the Boeing Company for injuries caused by a used hydraulic planer that Boeing had sold 
Statutory Preemption
Certain states have enacted or are considering legislation exempting used Idaho goods sellers from strict liability actions. The language in documents supporting these statutes general includes many of the arguments mentioned herein, particularly those regarding minimum seller knowledge about product defects.
Public Policy Chain of Distribution
The distribution chain arguments essentially holds the entire channel Arizona, New Jersey, responsible for damages because it is the channel that results in products Oregon, Washington reaching final consumers. Thus liability passes back up the channel to the used goods seller. The channel is therefore responsible for the safety of the products it places in the marketplace. This is the same policy argument used to justify strict liability for sellers of new products. 
Resellers' Actions Rationale
When the seller has rebuilt or reconditioned products that it then sells, strict liability generally applies. A similar consensus exists when the seller's defective repair work has caused injuries [Shapo 1990 ]. The results are less certain when the seller reconditions products utilizing parts purchased from a third party. .7 Absent allegations that defects in the braking system existed in a used car when it left the dealer or that the dealer had created the defects, the court declined to subject the defendant used car dealer to strict liability. Doing so, the majority declared, would make the dealer an insurer against defects that had come into existence after the product had left the original chain of distribution and come under control of one or more consumers.
In
In Tauber-Arons Auctioneers v. Superior Court [1980] , a California appellate court likewise declined to apply strict liability to used goods sales where no proof existed that the defendant seller had created the defect that caused plaintiff's injuries. A worker had sued the seller of a used planer that caused his injuries. The court noted that the plaintiff had not presented any other bases, such as salespersons' statements or promotional brochures, that would have supported justifiable expectations regarding the safety, quality, and durability of the planer. Furthermore, the court regarded a used goods dealer as outside the "enterprise" that produces and distributes the new product to consumers. Con-sequently, there was no continuing business relationship between the ordinary used machinery dealer and the manufacturer that would have allowed the former to make adjustments for the costs of protecting itself against strict liability.
Similarly, in LaRosa v. Superior Court [1981], another
California court rejected strict liability when defendant seller of a used punch press showed that it did not cause the product defect in question and had expressly disclaimed any responsibility for its condition. The court also observed that used goods buyers "consciously" traded off quality for lower price. Courts in many other states have also declined to impose strict liability for latent product defects that the used goods dealer neither caused nor could have discovered by reasonable and customary inspection [cf. Keith . In any event, the court said, a seller should bear responsibility for "safety defects, whether known or unknown at the time of sale, present while the machine was under his control." Thus, the Turner decision used an enterprise liability theory (i.e., distribution channel as an overall business enterprise) to hold used goods sellers strictly liable for defects, including latent ones, that existed when the product was under the seller's control.8
Arizona took the same approach in Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance [1983] , a case that involved a used propane fuel tank with a defective shut-off valve that caused an explosion that destroyed plaintiff's house. The opinion followed Turner, noting with approval the observation that used products buyers still expect safety when purchasing a serviceable product as opposed to junk parts. It further agreed with the enterprise liability theory as the basis for invoking strict liability and explicitly stated that a seller need not be in the "initial chain" of distribution to be regarded as part of the enterprise. The court also stated that used goods sellers as a class could shift losses, distribute costs, and insure against risks.9 [See also Thompson v. Rockford Machine Tool Co.
1987.] Applying Strict Liability to Used Products Transactions Legal/Policy Questions
The legal controversies surrounding strict liability for used goods marketers largely involve the applicability of enterprise liability theory. Many courts decline to include used goods as part of the "enterprise," which, for new goods transactions, includes suppliers of component parts, manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and other intermediaries. Treating the entire production and marketing system as a single enterprise for liability purposes leads to the spreading of risks and costs, providing strong incentives for product safety, and maximizing consumer protection. Having been hurt by a new product, the consumer sues the seller, some form of retailer, who in turn brings other members of the distribution network, including the manufacturer, into the dispute. The court, by applying the Restatement [1965] and common law precedent, then determines who should bear burden of compensating the injured consumer. By denying used goods buyers access to the marketing "enterprise," some courts have effectively required such buyers to carry the responsibility for their injuries, regardless of the manner in which the product became defective.
The extent to which manufacturers/marketers of new products also participate in used goods channels provides another view of enterprise liability theory. From a "first impression" standpoint, one might conclude that manufacturers that are not active in used goods distribution should not be found liable under strict liability. Their involvement could be described as passive, so why should they be lia- whatever advantages the application of strict liability might offer in terms of meeting consumers' product expectations and reducing risks through incentives for better products were offset by a desire to hold the strict liability doctrine within manageable bounds [Tillman 1979 ]. The opinion suggests that strict liability would change the very nature of used goods markets, presumably by pricing the more dangerous items out of the market.
The extension of strict liability to used goods transactions probably would raise prices, as the enterprise theory predicts. If used goods dealers are required to issue warnings that take into account the age, appearance, price, and expected durability of its wares, prices of these products must increase to cover these activities. The same forces yield the same result in new product markets, however. We must decide, as a matter of public policy, if it makes sense to trade off product safety for somewhat lower prices in one market (used goods) and not the other (new products). We must determine if buyers of used products have lower expectations regarding safety than buyers of new products. Are buyers willing to purchase lower-priced used goods and bear the increased risks associated with the abolition of strict liability in these markets? Perhaps some consumers will be able to acquire certain products only if they can buy used goods without the protection of strict liability. As a society are we willing to allow these buyers to make this choice? Ultimately, the question becomes one of protecting consumers and their justifiable expectations of safe products: Is this objective equally compelling for both new and used goods transactions?
Liability for latent defects in used goods raises another troublesome question. California, for example, has rejected strict liability when the seller of a used punch press had the facilities to repair it before the sale, but did not do so This extends even to those intermediaries that are expected to pass products along to the next firm in the distribution channel without inspection. It would seem that the same underlying policy objectives that the enterprise liability theory promotes in these and other new product sales ought to apply as well to used goods transactions.
The enterprise argument for strict liability is further bolstered by looking at what constitutes the difference in legal standing between the original and subsequent owners of a product-a simple resale of the item. The product has still been introduced into the channel by the manufacturer, who should bear the responsibility for producing and marketing safe products, regardless of who happens to own them. Strict liability provides an avenue for users to reach such manufacturers/marketers. Alternatively, the used product channel or enterprise is different from new product channels in a simple but significant way: the presence of the used product seller. The inclusion of this entity within the channel reduces the certainty that a product defect occurred during manufacturing because the used goods seller had the opportunity to handle the product, perhaps even damaging it. Perhaps the used product seller overused the item, thereby making it unsafe for subsequent use. Holding a manufacturer strictly liable when an intermediate owner used the product over an extended period of time essentially makes the manufacturer responsible to later buyers for the actions of earlier buyersan untenable position for the manufacturer. Thus, enterprise liability may place too great a burden on channel members handling used products.
Though courts occasionally hold lessors of used goods strictly liable under enterprise liability arguments [cf. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing 1965; Ausness 1987], rent-toown firms (RTO) have yet to be tested with strict liability claims. RTO companies differ from traditional leasing firms in that the latter typically provide only financial services and usually do not take physical possession of the goods they lease. RTOs, however, engage in hybrid transactions because their customers can opt out of rental contracts or can apply rental fees toward eventual product ownership [Nehf 1991] . If an RTO specializes in certain product lines, it presumably becomes expert with regard to these products, most likely repairing them when necessary. Such a company thereby possesses knowledge equivalent to that of a routine seller of these products. To absolve RTOs of strict liability simply because they are legally organized as leasing companies provides sellers a tantalizing loophole in product liability law.
The most defensible development regarding liability of used goods sellers is the shielding of one-time sellers from strict liability. To expect someone selling a used lawnmower at a garage sale to guarantee its safety is probably unreasonable-such a seller should not be subject to strict liability. However, the courts need to develop a more clearcut definition of "occasional" seller and a decision rule for weighting the expertise of such sellers.
Marketing/Policy Questions Some fundamental marketing-and policy-related questions need to be investigated. First, buyer expectations, for both consumer and industrial segments, regarding used product safety expectations need to be determined for various product markets. It is difficult to imagine that a rational used product buyer would expect an unsafe product, though he or she might anticipate less durability or poorer functional The used vehicle market might be a useful one within which to make these assessments. Thousands of claims have been filed in the United States for used vehicle-related injuries. Though most of these disputes involve warranty or negligence actions, the interrelatedness of safety, performance, and price surface routinely. Comparisons could be made between judicial assumptions regarding these tradeoffs and the implicit and explicit assumptions made by used vehicle buyers. Used cars are often sold "as is" without any seller representations of quality; however, used car dealers cannot simply disclaim their tort liability or obligations regarding implied warranties of fitness. Therefore, an "as is" seller must still inspect the vehicle and place it in reasonable working condition [Korpela 1991; Soehnel 1991] .
Current research perspectives could prove to be quite useful here. Bloom [1989] , for example, proposes a seven-step analysis to determine the appropriate policy stance regarding information available to consumers in product markets. Among these factors are the harm suffered by consumers and the availability and type of informational cues (internal and external) in the market. Used and new product markets could be examined utilizing a framework comprising these factors. To the extent that no significant differences can be derived when comparing used and new product markets, one could argue that the legal system should make no distinctions.
From the used goods buyer's perspective, Bayus [1991] found that buyers who replace new automobiles "early" are concerned about styling and image, whereas "late" replacement buyers are more concerned about cost. Perhaps the same attributes are of relatively similar importance when comparing different purchasers of used goods that vary in age. That is, those who buy extremely old used products may have no expectations regarding safety; instead, they consider cost and some minimal level of performance. As a matter of public policy, should these people be permitted to forgo product safety without legal recourse?
Relatedly, Mowen and Mowen [1991, p. 57] provide instructive propositions. They hypothesize that people have a strong tendency to choose courses of action with immediate positive outcomes but delayed negative consequences. Used goods and their associated safety levels may illustrate just such a situation. Consumers can choose used products over new goods because of favorable price considerations, incorrectly discounting the greater potential dangers of used items in the future. If these kinds of choices are being made, strict liability could be properly applied, encouraging sellers to improve product safety to protect buyers who make risky decisions. This suggestion assumes, of course, that society should protect these buyers from themselves. Alternatively, if these buyers cannot be forced to understand the risks involved, perhaps they should bear the consequences.
Simply warning prospective used goods buyers, regardless of the legal adequacy of such warnings, may be insufficient. Tanner, Hunt, and Eppright [1991, p. 43] conclude that communicated threats may not actually be perceived by certain audiences as being severe. Buyers with maladaptive coping behaviors, particular consumers with prior safe experiences with used goods, may assuage their fears by thinking, "It won't happen to me." Such thinking provides psychological relief but does nothing to remove potential dangers. These results are consistent with the findings of Mowen and Mowen [1991] and may indicate that, for some people, most warnings will simply be ineffective.
The critical nature of warnings and other forms of information is also relevant from the standpoint of pricing used goods. Tellis and Gaeth [1990] report that increased levels of information lead to "better" choice decisions in terms of new product value (price/quality). Marketers need to determine if this same relationship holds for used products and if the cost of information provision can be passed along to consumers. More importantly from the standpoint of product safety, are consumers willing to choose high-value alternatives that are both low price and low quality/safety if they have adequate information? This is another line of reasoning suggesting that used products buyers may be inclined toward unsafe choices.
If used goods sellers must meet a strict liability standard, they may be restricted in terms of pricing options. Consumers may be unwilling to bear the costs of strict liability and associated insurance premiums. If this is the case, used goods markets may well disappear for some products, at least in the United States. The long-term outcome may be that used products will be increasingly exported to lessdeveloped countries or nations with less stringent liability environments.
The literature on economics of information provides an overview perspective on safety-related information. 
Conclusion
On balance, extending strict liability to sellers of used goods would serve many of the public policy goals that the doctrine fosters for new product transactions. One difference, a critical one that needs to be investigated empirically, is the level of consumer reliance on the apparent safety of used goods. Do consumers believe that used goods are as safe as new products, or do they equate lower used goods prices with a lesser degree of safety? And, if the latter question is answered affirmatively, should society permit the safety-price trade-off?
Enterprise liability can also be applied to used products channels, but the situation is complicated by the potential intervening and unknown actions of prior owners of used goods. Holding used goods sellers strictly liable essentially makes them responsible for the consequences of actions of persons (prior product owners) over whom they have absolutely no control. Such an outcome creates a legal problem in that it violates the causation requirement of the strict liability doctrine. However, failure to inspect used products or warn buyers about dangers known to the seller seems to be reasonable grounds for strict liability.
Therefore, commercial organizations that regularly market used products should be held strictly liable. The word "regularly" brings such sellers within the conventional used goods enterprise and the failure to inspect or warn can be linked causally with the consumer's injury. Occasional sellers, those not in the business of routinely selling used goods, should not be held strictly liable because they are not a part of the marketing enterprise that redistributes used products. Such sellers are also unlikely to be expert with regard to the quality of the items they are selling. . In these cases the defendant "enterprise" was the various competitors marketing DES during certain time periods. Each of these firms was held liable for the collective acts of the enterprise (and each tried to exonerate itself by blaming others) because the fungible nature of DES made it impossible for plaintiffs to identify any one defendant's DES as the harmful substance. Thus, the DES and related cases examined competition among firms at the same horizontal level within competing, similar channels and formed the enterprise among these firms. In the present discussion the "enterprise" is the traditional vertical channel of distribution. In a product liability action involving a used product, the plaintiff typically sues all members of the channel or enterprise involved in marketing the used product. If the court cannot determine which channel member's actions led to the product causing the plaintiff s injuries, the channel as an enterprise can be held liable. Channel members must then sort out among themselves how to share the burden of compensating the plaintiff. See Priest [1985] 
